understandings and priorities concerning the public goods at stake, and, in the process, ensuring a space for implementing intellectual property regimes in a manner appropriate to their needs.
i. making choices between the production of competing public goods
Under the classic definition, public goods are distinguished from private goods in two respects. First, public goods are non-excludable in their benefits so that they cannot be withheld practicably from one individual without withholding them from others. Second, they are non-rivalrous in their consumption so that their consumption by one individual does not diminish their availability. 4 National defense is a classic public good that requires government funding because of collective action and free rider problems were production left to the private market. This two-fold 'publicness' of a good, however, typically lies along a continuum, so that goods may combine public and private attributes, complicating the assessment of how to generate them. Economists often refer to goods that do not fully meet the two criteria, but have significant public attributes, as 'impure' public goods.
This section makes three central points concerning the production of public goods in the context of the debate over pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement. First, the key problem with public goods is how to produce them, in particular in light of free rider problems. If public goods are non-excludable, then why would a private party ever invest in their production? The simple solution is to rely on the state for their production. For example, public grants, such as through the National Science Foundation and the National Institute for Health, can finance basic research that otherwise would not be funded sufficiently through the private market. However, production by the state is beset by tradeoffs, ranging from bureaucratic inefficiencies (shirking) to political corruption (stealing, pork barrel projects, logrolling, and disinformation). An alternative for the production of public goods is to tie their production to private goods, as through the recognition of private rights that generate positive externalities. For example, knowledge and technological development can be viewed as public goods generated through the recognition and enforcement of private patent rights, provided that the invention is published in a public registry and the rights are limited in scope and time. However, the granting of private rights also gives rise to strategic behavior, as when private actors threaten litigation to chill research and productive activity of competitors. 5 There are 4 See Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods numerous options for tying public goods to private rights beside patents, including through liability, as opposed to property rights, regimes. 6 Yet all of these alternatives involve tradeoffs.
Second, more than one public good is at stake in the TRIPS context and these public goods can conflict. Choices over the generation of at least three public goods arise in the pharmaceutical patent context: knowledge-generation, liberalized trade, and public health. To start with knowledge, it has public good attributes since once knowledge enters the public domain, it is no longer excludable and our consumption does not diminish its availability. However, knowledge can be subject to some excludability, as through trade secrets and patents, so that it is not a pure public good. 7 The central issue is how to most effectively and equitably generate knowledge that facilitates new inventions and understandings. The choice must be made in light of the tradeoffs between the inefficiencies and inequities of granting private monopoly rights that take knowledge out of the public domain, the inefficiencies and inequities of markets that fail to recognize intellectual property rights and reduce incentives to invent, and the inefficiencies and inequities of government funding decisions. Any meaningful analysis must be comparative.
Free trade similarly has significant public good attributes, since the benefits of free trade policies, once adopted, are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. 8 We all benefit from the wider variety of products available at lower prices that trade liberalization facilitates. The creation of a global system of trade rules coupled with legalized dispute settlement likewise has public good attributes. A rule-based international legal system facilitates a more secure and stable international trading system from which all nations benefit. It helps avoid the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that undermined the global economy of the 1930s. Yet liberalized trade is an impure public good as well, since it can be subject to some excludability, whether through restricting membership to the 6 9 We all benefit from the global eradication of diseases and we do not diminish that good when we benefit from it. Like the ripple effects from financial shocks and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies, diseases do not respect borders, as the AIDS and SARS epidemics have made terribly clear. The central issue, once again, is comparative, regarding how, among the alternative choices, do we produce the public good of public health in a relatively efficient and equitable manner.
The fact that these public goods may conflict further complicates national and global decision-making. The recognition and enforcement of 'strong' patent rights interferes with market forces and diminishes the benefits of liberalized trade. Firms can lobby to rig intellectual property systems to lock in private monopoly rights over products and processes involving minimal scientific advances. The extent to which patent rules need to be harmonized globally is subject to serious question. 10 Strong patent rights also interfere with the provision of public health policies, as the global AIDS epidemic demonstrates. UNAIDS estimates that approximately 30 million people are infected with AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in 2.4 million deaths from AIDS and 3.5 million new AIDS infections in 2002 alone.
11 As you read these paragraphs, hundreds of people have died of AIDS because of their lack of access to medication. Balancing enforcement of developed country patents against millions of avoidable sub-Saharan African deaths is indefensible. Yet advocates of patent protection point out that if free trade and public health policies always override patent protection, then the private sector will invest less in the development of new medications, potentially affecting public health and technology transfer over the long run. 12 See, e.g., Alan Sykes, 'TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha ''Solution''', 21, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (suggesting that the lack of research on diseases present in developing countries 'is attributable in significant part to heretofore weak intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals in developing countries').
As must any other court, a WTO judicial panel asked to 'recognize' public goods when it hears a case involving pharmaceutical patent protection faces a major dilemma. It cannot simply recognize a public good in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. It must rather take account of concerns over competing public goods as reflected in the agreement's provisions.
Because public goods concerns conflict, the third (and central) issue is institutional. That is, who decides who decides how the competing concerns should be balanced? Decisions as to how to produce public goods ultimately depend on decisions by national, regional, and international political and legal bodies that, in turn, affect market processes. Where institutions create, recognize, and enforce private intellectual property rights, such as patents, key issues arise concerning their duration, scope, and exceptions. While the choice among alternatives may be complicated at the national level, the choice becomes much more so at the international level where problems of numbers and complexity multiply. Balancing concerns over competing public goods and defining the means for the production of these goods involve tradeoffs over preferences and priorities that vary in a world of divergent levels of development and limited public finances. The dynamics of participation in national, regional, and international decision-making over the production of public goods thus becomes decisive.
The ultimate issue in choosing among the production of public goods becomes institutional because different institutions offer different opportunities for actors to participate, affecting which perspectives on the appropriate balancing are advanced. Problems of biased participation beset each institutional alternative on account of informational and resource asymmetries and divergent incentives to participate because of varying per capita stakes in outcomes. The key issue from a public policy perspective is the assessment of the relative merits of institutional processes in terms of the relatively unbiased participation of affected parties compared to the (nonidealized) institutional alternatives. 13 That is, who decides who decides? Or put differently, which institutional process, among alternative political, judicial, and market processes at the local, national, regional, and international levels, should decide on the appropriate balancing? This institutional choice, in turn, affects how different interests, directly and indirectly, are taken into account, and thus ultimately determines who decides.
A WTO dispute settlement panel inevitably faces these institutional choices when hearing a dispute over pharmaceutical patent protection. As examined in Part II, a WTO judicial process itself can decide on the appropriate balancing of the conflicting public goods concerns, or it can effectively allocate decision-making to an alternative institutional process at the national or international level. Who participates in the institutional process affects which arguments will be presented, which, in turn, affects how the competing concerns over patent protection, public health, and market competition will be weighed.
ii. interpreting the trips agreement to advance public goods concerns: the institutional choices Provisions of the WTO agreements address each of the three public goods of knowledge-generation, liberalized trade, and public health. First and foremost, the central goal of the WTO is the promotion of liberalized trade. The preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, to which the TRIPS Agreement is an annex, calls for 'the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade'. This language mirrors the preamble of the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. The first and third declared goals of the TRIPS Agreement in the first paragraph of its preamble are 'to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade' and 'to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade'. The GATT, which is now the first annex to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, explicitly recognizes national intellectual property laws as a potential barrier to trade. The GATT creates certain exceptions to its requirements in Article XX, which lists intellectual property protection as a legitimate ground for trade restrictions. These trade restrictions, however, are subject to the condition that they must not be more trade restrictive than 'necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement [the GATT], including those relating to . . . the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights'. 14 The introduction of Article XX, known in trade circles as the 'chapeau', further provides that these trade restrictions must not constitute 'unjustifiable discrimination' or 'a disguised restriction on international trade'. In 1989, a GATT panel held that Section 337 of the US Trade Act of 1930, which provides for the exclusion of goods that infringe a US patent, violated GATT's non-discrimination provisions and was not protected by the Article XX(d) exception because foreign products accused of infringing a US patent were treated less favorably than domestic products.
The protection of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
In other words, the agreement aims to spur 'innovation' and 'dissemination of technology' (i.e. knowledge) through the protection of intellectual property, subject to 'social and economic welfare' considerations. The TRIPS Agreement's preamble notes the members' desire 'to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights', including through 'effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property rights'. 16 The preamble recognizes these rights as 'private' rights.
17 Articles 27-34 set forth the required provisions for patent protection, including the scope of patentable subject matter, the exclusive rights conferred to the patent owner, the patent term (20 years from filing), the conditions imposed on patent applicants, the 'limited exceptions' to these exclusive rights, and the conditions of compulsory patent licenses. As regards the issue of patented medicines, the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the 'Doha Declaration'), while 'reaffirming' the 'flexibility' of the TRIPS Agreement for members to 'protect public health', also confirms members' recognition 'that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines'. 18 Finally, the TRIPS Agreement expressly recognizes the need to promote the third public good at issue -the promotion of public health. Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth the agreement's 'Principles', confirming that members 'may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition'. As regards patents specifically, Article 27.2 provides for the exclusion of patentability where 'necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment'. Article 30 declares that 'members may provide for limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred', such as in recognition of the agreement's objectives and principles. Article 31 sets forth exceptions to the requirement of obtaining authorization from a right holder to use the patent, including 'in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency'. 19 When concerns arose that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement could nonetheless impede developing countries' public health 16 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the TRIPS preamble. 17 Paragraph 4 of the preamble. policies, most immediately in light of the AIDS epidemic, the United States and other developed countries were pressed into signing the Doha Declaration, which declared that the TRIPS Agreement provides 'flexibility' for members to take measures to protect public health. Paragraph 5 of the declaration set forth a list of what these flexibilities included, and in particular that 'each provision of the TRIPS Agreement [i.e. including the patent provisions in Articles 27-34] shall be read in light of the object and purpose of the agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles' (i.e. Articles 7-8 that include the protection of public health and social welfare). Just before the Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003, the WTO General Council issued a decision implementing paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (the 'Paragraph 6 Decision'). 20 This decision waived obligations set forth in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement so as to facilitate the grant of 'compulsory licenses' for the supply of medicines from any third country to countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. The decision, which 'is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that Members have' under the TRIPS Agreement, is to continue until such time as 'an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect'.
21
The inclusion of the terms 'flexibilities' and 'without prejudice' suggest that other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, such as the Article 30 exceptions clause, could shield developing countries from challenge were a complaint involving pharmaceutical patent protection brought against them before a WTO panel. Already under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, WTO panels are to interpret and apply the provisions of WTO agreements in light of their object and purpose. 22 Through the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 Decision, WTO Members simply confirmed the importance of a 'flexible' interpretation of intellectual property requirements in line with the TRIPS Agreement's general 'objectives' and 'principles'.
The challenges facing a future WTO panel are thus considerable. Moreover, a WTO panel's choice involves not only competing policy goals, but also at least three institutional alternatives for balancing these goals. First, the WTO panel could interpret the TRIPS Agreement 'flexibly' to show deference to national determinations of the appropriate balancing of public goods concerns (as reflected in the Agreement's statement of 'Objectives' and 'Principles' and confirmed in the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 Decision). The panel would essentially allocate the balancing decision to the national level. Second, the panel could stringently apply the specific provisions of the TRIPS Agreement on patent protection (paragraphs 27-34) as setting a 'floor' for international intellectual property protection that all members must meet so as to limit national determinations on the appropriate balancing. 23 Any diminutions of the intellectual property rights set forth in these paragraphs would have to be determined by the TRIPS Council or through a future round of WTO intergovernmental negotiations (i.e. through a further international political process in which the United States and other developed countries wield considerable clout). 24 Third, the panel could itself engage in what it deems to be the most appropriate balancing of liberalized trade, patent rights protection, and public health goals on a case-by-case basis. In this latter case, the judicial panel would allocate the balancing to itself (an international judicial process) and take a more activist role in flexibly applying open-ended provisions of the TRIPS Agreement to assess the costs and benefits of competing public goods concerns in a specific factual context. In doing so, the panel could take account of not only the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 Decision, but also the wider national and international context, including the programs of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNAIDS, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 25 These implicit institutional decisions affect who participates in the weighing of the competing public goods since participation will vary depending on whether the assessment is made through a national political or judicial process or alternative international political and judicial processes. The WTO judicial panel's decision shapes political bargaining in these alternative fora and, ultimately, market processes. As regards market processes, a stringent application of patent rights will keep market prices high in developing countries because of the lack of competition. Similarly, a judicial decision that is factually-contextualized and case-specific can give rise to considerable legal uncertainty. This legal uncertainty would reduce the incentive for producers of generic medicines to invest in the production of the desired drugs since the 23 producers may fear costly legal challenges that would undermine their investments.
26
Were the WTO judicial process to interpret the TRIPS Agreement 'flexibly' and show broad deference to national decision-making over pharmaceutical patent protection to meet public health goals, the United States and European Community (EC), as demanders of strict enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights, could still bargain with the regulating country, but the bargaining context would change. As a result, developing countries would no longer have to offer something to the United States and EC in return to obtain an 'exception' to the TRIPS requirements. Moreover, the normative framework of the bargaining would change. An international panel would have held that the developing countries' actions were lawful.
In addition, US and European multinational firms could still participate in national bargaining within developing countries over the appropriate interface of pharmaceutical patent protection and health care policies, even if a WTO panel deferred to those countries' policy decisions. US and European firms would still retain significant leverage in light of the investment and other financial resources that they offer. Yet the institutional setting would be quite different on account of the effective allocation of authority to national institutional processes made by the WTO panel. Such a decision would not only intensify price competition for the sale of pharmaceutical products in developing countries. It could also spur the development of markets that may not exist because monopoly right holders lack the incentive to tailor production for developing country purchases because of right holders' focus on rich-country markets. 27 In short, in disputes over pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement, WTO panels necessarily confront concerns over competing public goods, on the one hand, and institutional choices, on the other. In evaluating how WTO dispute settlement panels should recognize public goods or how they should allocate decision-making to other institutional processes, we first need to assess who currently participates in the WTO judicial process, and then address mechanisms to ensure relatively less-biased , ECR 1-2975), but only after much of the domestic battle was lost. 27 Compare Sykes, above n 12 (maintaining that patent enforcement in developing countries combined with a ban on parallel imports should increase the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to create and market new drugs for the needs of developing country constituencies). Sykes, however, while calling this an empirical question, fails to mention the empirical work that has been done. See, e.g., sources in above n 10.
participation in framing the analysis and assessing the impact of alternative choices. It is to these issues that we now turn.
iii. participation in wto dispute settlement: who participates? who decides?
While others have written cogent accounts of biases in the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, 28 this section addresses biases in participation before the WTO dispute settlement system. 29 Participation in WTO judicial processes is arguably more important than is participation in analogous judicial processes for shaping law in national systems. The difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law through the WTO political process enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence. WTO law requires consensus to modify, resulting in a rigid legislative system, with rule modifications occurring through infrequent negotiating rounds. Because of the complex bargaining process, rules often are drafted in a vague manner, thereby delegating de facto power to the WTO dispute settlement system to effectively make WTO law through interpretation.
As a result of the increased importance of WTO jurisprudence and the rigidity of the WTO political process, those governments that are able to participate most actively in the WTO dispute settlement system are bestpositioned to effectively shape the law's interpretation and application over time. Not surprisingly, the United States and European Community remain by far the predominant users of the system, and thereby are most likely to advance their interests through the judicial process. As repeat players, the United States and EC strive not only to win individual cases. They also play for rules. They attempt to shape judicial interpretation of WTO rules over time.
From 1948 through the end of June 2000, the United States was either a complainant or defendant in 340 GATT/WTO disputes, constituting 52% of the total number of 654 disputes, while the European Community was a party in 238 disputes, or 36% of that total.
30 Moreover, the United States and EC are typically third parties in cases where they are not complainants or 28 31 In contrast, the vast majority of developing countries have participation rates of zero percent or in the single digits in respect of WTO cases that resulted in an adopted report. 32 As of 1 November 2003, no sub-Saharan African country had initiated a WTO complaint.
As for complaints under the TRIPS Agreement, either the United States or EC initiated 21 of the 23 TRIPS complaints brought through January 2003 (15 by the United States and 6 by the EC). Brazil and Canada each initiated one TRIPS complaint, but these were merely symbolic claims that they filed in response to WTO complaints brought by the United States and EC against them. Brazil and Canada never seriously pursued their claims to advance commercial interests, but rather searched for bargaining chips for a potential settlement of the US and EC complaints. As regards TRIPS complaints that resulted in an adopted panel or Appellate Body report, the United States was a party or third party in all seven, and the EC in six of the seven, cases.
Law matters not only for the litigation of specific disputes, but, even more importantly, for settlements negotiated in the law's shadow. 33 There are two primary shadow effects of law: the law's substance and the costs of invoking the law's procedures. First, WTO law's substance, as defined through WTO jurisprudence, provides bargaining chips, informing and constraining settlement negotiations. Second, as Herbert Kritzer writes, 'the ability to impose costs on the opponent and the capability of absorbing costs' affect how the law operates in practice. 34 Where large developed countries, such as the 31 United States and EC, can absorb high litigation costs by dragging out a WTO case, while imposing them on developing country parties, they can enhance developing countries' incentives to settle a dispute unfavorably. Developing countries' relative participation in the international trade dispute settlement system in complaints against developed countries has declined since the advent of the WTO compared to their relative participation under the less-legalized GATT. As Reinhardt has documented, developing countries were 'one-third less likely to file complaints against developed states under the WTO than they were under the post-1989 GATT regime'. In contrast, Busch and Reinhardt show that 'the fraction of cases targeting [developing countries] has risen dramatically, from 19 to 33 percent', suggesting that a developing country 'is up to five times more likely to be subject to a complaint under the WTO'. 35 Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki confirm that, under the WTO, 'the developing country share in terms of being a defendant rose to 37 percent' compared to 'only 8 percent of all cases brought during the GATT years'. 36 Constantine Michalopoulos has documented how developing countries' use of the WTO dispute settlement against developed countries is considerably less than their share of developed country trade. 'By mid 2000, 46 per cent of the developed countries' complaints had been lodged against developing-country WTO Members, while the latter accounted for only about 25 per cent of developed-country trade. Just over 50 per cent of the developing countries' complaints, on the other hand, were lodged against developed countries, considerably less than the latter's share of trade with developing countries.' 37 In many cases, developing countries' participation is overstated by reference to numerical charts, since the developing country is piggy-backing on a US or EC complaint in what US officials dub 'me too' cases.
Developing countries, other than the largest ones such as Brazil and India, are less likely to participate actively in WTO litigation because of two central structural factors respectively affecting the benefits and costs of their participation: (i) individual developing countries' relatively smaller value, volume and variety of exports, resulting in lower absolute benefits from participation in the WTO dispute settlement system, and (ii) the relatively high cost of access to the system and developing countries' reduced economies of scale for mobilizing legal resources. First, developing countries often have high per capita stakes in individual cases, so that WTO law could be of potential benefit to them. In fact, a developing country may have much higher relative stakes over a given trade measure than the United States and 35 39 Since an average WTO claim costs in the range of US$300-400,000 in attorneys' fees (although they possibly can be much more), 40 such a developing country could not even cover its attorneys' fees were it to prevail in a 'high stakes' claim before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and Honduras is not even a 'least-developed country'. Even for larger developing countries such as Peru and Malaysia, although a comparable 'high stakes' claim would be valued at around US$2-3 million, the risk of loss or non-compliance would significantly discount the case's value. 41 Second, the cost of bringing an individual WTO case has risen, also reducing developing countries' incentives to participate. The WTO Appellate Body and WTO panels employ a highly contextualized, case-based approach, based on jurisprudence where individual case opinions average in the hundreds of pages. As a consequence, the demand on lawyer time, and thus the cost of specialized legal expertise, has skyrocketed. Litigation at the international level involves a distant forum in which legal expertise is US and Euro-centric, highly specialized, and quite expensive. Developing countries can face fees ranging from $200-$600 (or more) an hour when they hire private law firms to advise and represent them in WTO cases. 42 Developing countries not only must weigh these costs against the uncertain, but smaller, benefits of litigating a WTO case. They also must consider the opportunity costs of expending money on outside trade counsel instead of otherwise addressing development and social concerns in countries where the population makes less than $2 a day. The factors of developing country stakes and WTO litigation costs are interrelated. The costs of participation in WTO dispute settlement are absolute, regardless of the relative benefits. As Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival write regarding domestic litigation, '[a]s costs rise, so does the threshold at which litigation becomes worthwhile.' 43 Since developing countries export a vastly narrower array and limited value and volume of exports than do the United States and EC, they are less likely to be repeat players in WTO litigation. 44 Because of their less frequent use of the WTO system, they benefit from fewer economies of scale in deploying legal resources. As a result, the benefits for a developing country to bring a WTO case are less likely to exceed the threshold of litigation costs that make bringing the case worthwhile, especially in light of the uncertainty of WTO remedies. 45 Because of developing countries' lack of resources, low aggregate stakes in WTO dispute settlement, and inability to benefit from economies of scale, developing countries are not developing human capital and know-how in WTO law that can be tapped, when needed, for WTO disputes. Most developing countries have few law schools and no professors that teach WTO law. In consequence, private lawyers are not available within developing countries to advise local firms, trade associations, and government officials on WTO rights and to work with them and developing country governments to defend those rights in WTO litigation and settlement negotiations. The small supply of lawyers educated in WTO law within developing countries thus increases the cost for developing country firms and governments to become aware of WTO rights. In contrast, well over 100 law professors teach aspects of WTO law each year in the United States to over 3,000 law students.
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Large and well-organized US and European interests hire lawyers, economists, and other consultants on WTO matters, and then coordinate with US and EC public authorities. 47 The dozens of lawyers working for US and EC trade authorities are thus supplemented by legal assistance financed by the US and European private sector. Because of developing countries' less frequent use of the WTO system and their lack of local legal capital, the alternative for a developing country to train internal lawyers with WTO expertise is typically worse than hiring expensive US or European outside legal counsel. Training internal counsel entails a significant long-term allocation of resources, which is not cost-effective if a country is not an active player in the litigation system. Start-up costs are high and potential economies of scale low. Moreover, where a developing country's internal lawyers develop expertise and exhibit talent, they can be snatched up by private law firms that pay salaries against which developing countries cannot compete. Although lawyers regularly leave government in the United States for the private sector, the fact that they largely remain in Washington and often subsequently return to government as part of Washington's 'revolving door' bureaucratic culture means that US trade authorities are much more likely to take advantage of their acquired expertise. In the language of economics, a revolving door bureaucratic culture can have positive externalities for the United States in international litigation, since the developed expertise is available locally to be used predominantly by US firms and government officials. The spillover effects for developing countries, in contrast, are largely negative, since, once a developing country trade official leaves to work for the private sector in the United States or Europe, that individual is not available locally within the developing country and almost never returns to government service.
Developing countries' perceptions of the WTO system also feed back on their awareness of whether they have legal defenses and claims available. Where developing countries and their commercial constituents have little faith in the WTO system, they are less likely to develop mechanisms to detect manipulations and violations of WTO law that affect their interests. Even when they become aware of measures against which they could invoke their legal rights, developing countries are less likely to develop pro-active strategies to defend these rights and interests if they believe that the system is structured in a way that they cannot do so in a cost-effective manner. As is the case in domestic legal systems, those with greater wealth and education (in this case, US and European governments and commercial constituents) are more likely to recognize situations where they can deploy legal rights (in this case, WTO rights). 48 When they do so, they are well placed to 'bargain' in the law's shadow and realize their objectives. The following section addresses strategies that developing countries could pursue to overcome some of the challenges that they face.
iv. strategies for developing countries to overcome structural biases and advance their public goods concerns in wto dispute settlement Much of the struggle over the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement will be discursive. It will be a struggle over competing principles that involve competing conceptions and priorities over the public goods at stake. These principles and conceptions will be advanced by competing coalitions of public and private actors. In light of the severe disadvantages that most developing countries face before the WTO dispute settlement system (Part III), developing countries will need to devise strategies to mobilize resources to advance their conceptions and priorities, on the one hand, and undermine the extra-legal coercion that the United States and (to a lesser extent) the EC deploy, on the other. They need to find ways to make such coercive acts politically unpalatable for US and EC government and corporate elites.
The United States, the EC, and their multinational pharmaceutical companies know how to play the knowledge game. 49 As Susan Sell writes, 'it was not merely [US corporate actors'] relative economic power that led to their economic success [with the TRIPS Agreement], but their command of IP expertise, their ideas, their information, and their skills in translating complex issues into political discourse.'
50 Following the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, US industry continued to work with US public officials to 'educate' foreign governments. The United States regularly sent lawyers for the US pharmaceutical and copyright industries to Geneva as 'faculty' of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to teach developing country representatives about intellectual property matters and draft 'model' laws for their consideration. 51 Industry successfully lobbied Congress to allocate funds for these 'educational' efforts. 52 Industry similarly wishes to shape WTO panelists' conceptions of the appropriate interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
This section addresses WTO dispute settlement strategies from a broad perspective. Developing countries' legal strategies necessarily have relevance beyond dispute settlement since participation in WTO political and judicial processes are complementary. The shadow of WTO judicial processes shape bilateral negotiations, just as political processes and contexts inform judicial decisions. If developing countries can clarify their public goods priorities and coordinate their strategies, then they will more effectively advance their 49 Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism, above n 28. interests in bargaining conducted in WTO law's shadow, and in WTO legal complaints heard in the shadow of bargaining. 53 They, in turn, will be better prepared to exploit the 'flexibilities' of the TRIPS Agreement, tailoring their intellectual property laws accordingly, and will gain confidence in their ability to ward off US and EC threats against their policy choices. In other words, developing countries' international legal strategies have implications for their leverage in international political negotiations and for the policy space in which they implement domestic intellectual property and public health regimes.
This section examines the following three strategies: pooling government resources at the national, regional, and international levels; coordinating with private parties in the United States and Europe to undercut industry pressure in the formation of US and EC negotiating positions and litigation strategies; and working with generic producers of pharmaceuticals in political negotiations and judicial disputes so that the TRIPS Agreement's provisions are interpreted in a clear manner that induces the generic sector to invest the necessary resources to produce the desired drugs. These three strategies complement those proposed by others for the implementation of intellectual property regimes within developing countries to promote their economic growth and social welfare. 54 First, developing countries could pool their resources through national, regional, and international centers specializing in trade-related intellectual property issues. 55 Developing countries currently are forced to work with ad hoc assistance in WTO dispute settlement on a case-by-case basis. The development of national, regional, and international centers to advance their priorities can have mutually reinforcing effects. To participate effectively in regional and international centers, developing countries would need to better coordinate interagency policymaking at the national level. Interagency coordination would address the linkages between intellectual property protection, economic development, public health, and social welfare. Regional centers could create benchmarks for policy, provide a forum for the sharing of experiences, and identify best practices. Regional centers could 53 WTO panels are not courts, but 'dispute settlement' panels formed pursuant to the Understanding also better coordinate training of developing country officials and nongovernmental representatives. 56 These centers could work with academics, or be tied to an academic institution and benefit from student interns, like the Center for International and Environmental Law (CIEL) based at American University in Washington, DC (for trade-environment matters) and the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC) based at Stellenbosch University. 57 These centers could, in turn, work with a cross-national 'Academic Resource Group' on trade and intellectual property matters, as discussed by Peter Drahos and Michael Blakeney. 58 Developing countries now have the opportunity to obtain legal assistance on WTO law in a more cost-effective manner through an international legal services organization -the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Geneva. 59 There are two problems, however, with the Advisory Centre from the standpoint of intellectual property negotiations and disputes. The Advisory Centre has only seven lawyers who must be prepared to litigate over 19 WTO agreements. It thus lacks specific expertise in trade-related intellectual property matters. In addition, the Advisory Centre's sole focus is on WTO dispute settlement, while developing countries need to coordinate political and judicial strategies since intellectual property matters are advanced in a strategic fashion before multiple fora. Developing countries need to defend their legal interests not only before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the TRIPS Council, and at WTO ministerial meetings, but also before the WIPO, the WHO, UNAIDS, in regional negotiations such as over a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and in bilateral negotiations such as the trade agreements that the United States recently negotiated with Jordan, Singapore, and Chile, and is now pressing on numerous fronts. 60 The United States attempts to leverage stronger intellectual property protections from these bilateral trade negotiations, using the TRIPS Agreement as a foundation.
Developing countries could form a complementary international public interest law and policy center to assist them on intellectual property matters. National interagency committees and regional centers could act as focal points for coordinating international strategies. Such an international center could be funded through an endowment and user fees, as is the Advisory Centre on WTO Law. 61 The intellectual property center would combine a longer-term strategic outlook with intervention in specific cases. Because it would be a repeat player, it would develop a reservoir of expertise into which developing countries could tap, as needed. By coordinating strategies at the national, regional, and international levels, developing countries could more effectively offset the relentless US and EC bilateral pressure to ratchet up global patent rights over the longer term through constant forum-shifting. 62 They could continue to raise these issues through international organizations where they wield greater clout and where their public health concerns have greater resonance, such as the WHO's World Health Assembly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. They could strategically use these fora not only to shape global debates, but also perceptions within the WTO of the way that TRIPS itself should be read. 63 A global public interest law center for intellectual property matters could also collaborate with the Advisory Centre on TRIPS cases brought before WTO panels, just as public interest law firms coordinate in domestic litigation.
Second, developing countries need to work consistently with US and European political allies to alter the US and European domestic political contexts. International negotiations involve a two-level game in which national constituencies compete in the formation of national positions and those national positions then are advanced in international negotiations. 64 If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large pharmaceutical firms in the formation of US and European positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt of US and European coercion in the negotiation and enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights. In a world of asymmetric power, developing countries enhance the prospects of their success if other US and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical industry's pressure on US and European trade authorities to aggressively advance industry interests. Domestic and international non-governmental advocates, such as ACT UP, Doctors Without Borders, and Oxfam, have been natural allies. They raise fundamental moral issues to hold US and EC political leaders accountable. They also harness the public's self-interest over the cost of prescription drugs and public officials' struggles to finance health care commitments within the United States and Europe themselves. As Braithwaite and Drahos write, 'Had TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics in the US and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilizing the consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS.' 65 This strategy has worked in a number of cases. The United States backed off from challenging South Africa's and Brazil's pharmaceutical patent laws primarily in the context of US domestic political pressures. The United States withdrew its threat of initiating a WTO claim against South Africa in response to pressures from AIDS activists who gathered at Vice President Gore's presidential campaign stops holding placards for the nightly news and chanting 'Gore's greed kills!' 66 In June 2001, the Bush administration withdrew the United States' claim against Brazil's compulsory licensing provisions under Brazil's patent law following widespread protest against the US action from advocacy groups who maintained that the US government was placing corporate interests above life-and-death medical concerns. 67 Support from international health and human rights organizations complemented this NGO pressure. 68 USTR Robert Zoellick similarly abandoned the US pharmaceutical industry with little consultation in agreeing to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at Doha. 69 The Bush administration did so in the context of post-September 11 domestic politics, where the administration was undercut on compulsory licensing issues following the anthrax scare, and felt an intensified need to compromise on intellectual property matters in order to launch a new trade round. In short, when TRIPS issues become politicized domestically within the United States and Europe, developing countries retain greater leeway to develop intellectual property policies to fit their own needs.
Third, developing country governments and their legal advocates should work with the generic pharmaceutical sector, including companies from third countries, if they are to develop an effective strategy. The generic pharmaceutical sector in countries such as Brazil and India knows what it requires if it is to supply developing countries with the drugs that they need. The Doha Declaration confirms that 'each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds on which such licenses are granted.' The Paragraph 6 Decision creates a means for the grant of licenses from any third country to developing countries that lack the capacity and know-how to produce high-quality pharmaceuticals, as they lack the market size to justify the investment. Yet if the interpretation of the conditions for granting compulsory licenses under the Paragraph 6 Decision creates legal uncertainty, then generic companies will not invest in the needed production because of the threat of legal challenge. The United States Trade Representative has worked closely with the pharmaceutical industry and its trade association, PhRMA, to develop US negotiating positions and litigation strategies. 70 To ensure the effective supply of low-cost pharmaceuticals, public authorities in developing countries will need to coordinate similar strategies with the private generic pharmaceutical sector in third countries.
concluding remarks
Knowledge is not simply a private right and source of profits, though that is the way corporate stakeholders wish us to see it. Nor is knowledge only a public good, though that is the conception advocated by promoters of a knowledge commons. Knowledge is a form of power, shaping how we perceive the world and the alternative choices available to us, including for the production of knowledge itself. How will the WTO agreements be read to promote public goods in juxtaposition to private rights? How will the various goals of patent protection, liberalized trade, and public health be weighed?
Although WTO dispute settlement panels should recognize public goods, doing so is not a simple task. This article has shown how the TRIPS Agreement raises issues of competing public goods, and, in particular, conflicts among liberalized trade, knowledge-generation, and public health (Part I). Since the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement includes the promotion of competing public goods, there is no single way that the TRIPS Agreement can be read (Part II). 71 tradeoffs among these concerns. In doing so, a WTO panel faces institutional choices as to who should decide the appropriate balancing. In rendering a decision, a WTO panel can interpret the TRIPS Agreement to provide significant 'flexibility' for national decision-making processes. It can apply intellectual property rules strictly and public health concerns as narrow 'exceptions' and leave the determination of broader exceptions to a subsequent international political process. It can itself assess the costs and benefits of competing public goods in a fact-specific context. In each institutional setting, deliberation and bargaining will occur over the competing goals. In each setting, participation will be biased in one way or another, since institutions provide different opportunities for affected parties to participate. A WTO judicial panel's choice, in itself, will be shaped by who participates before it. As Part III demonstrated, most developing countries are at a significant disadvantage in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and negotiations in their shadow.
In order for developing countries to use the WTO dispute system effectively and thereby enhance their leverage in bilateral bargaining and their policy discretion domestically, they need to coordinate through multi-level, publicprivate networks. As the US and European pharmaceutical industry has long understood, it's a long-term, multi-level, high-stakes game. Developing countries need to work with strategic partners to frame perceptions over intellectual property matters and the particular provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in light of developing country objectives. They can thereby increase the chances that WTO panels will interpret public good concerns from their perspectives. As a consequence, they could increase the policy space in which they may implement domestic regulatory regimes to suit their needs, and gain confidence in their ability to ward off US and EC legal threats to these choices. If US and European legal challenges are constrained, generic pharmaceutical producers will more likely invest in the production of the needed life-saving drugs.
